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Social Inequality and Marginalization of
Transgender Individuals
Dr. Bruce Gentry
Faculty Mentor
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to assess the numerous issues of marginalization, discrimination, and health
disparities experienced by transgender individuals in U.S.
culture. These experiences include those fostered by the
cisgender heterosexual majority as well as the LGBT community. Legal issues, biological essentialism, and social
inequality will be addressed, with a focus on transgender
women as at high risk for hate crimes. Intersectionality
is frequently addressed due to the multitude of identities
transgender men and women occupy at a single time and
throughout their lifespan (Gutierrez, 2004).
While the terms “sex” and “gender” are considered
common nomenclature in U.S. discourse, their conceptualizations are susceptible to various subjective definitions
according to use. From a scientific perspective, sex is
reflective of biological disposition while gender is influenced by psychological state as well as social and cultural
location. According to Yarber and Sayad (2013) sex refers
to “whether one is biologically female or male, based on
genetic and anatomical sex.” (p. 8). In addition, sex includes genetic factors such as chromosomal arrangement
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and hormonal levels as well as anatomical genital representation (Yarber & Sayad, 2013). In the U.S., anatomical
sex is commonly used to assign gender at birth (Brill &
Pepper, 2008). Two critical concepts within gender include gender identity and expression, each of which plays
a significant role psychological, emotional, and social
development of the individual (Brill & Pepper, 2008).
Gender identity “refers to a person’s internalized, deeply
felt sense of being male, female, both, or neither. […] Because gender identity is internal and personally defined, it
is not visible to others” (Brill & Pepper, 2008, p.4). Gender identity is therefore the part of gender that is up to
the individual to determine; it can vary greatly from one’s
gender assigned at birth. It is not uncommon, however,
for gender identity to align itself with the biological sex. A
person is considered to be cisgender if they identify with
the sex they were assigned at birth. For example, someone with the designation F on their birth certificate who
identifies as female would be categorized as a cisgender
woman (Serano, 2007).
Gender expression “is how we externalize our gender” (Brill & Pepper, 2008, p.4). This includes the aspects
of gender that are visible to the naked eye, ranging from
the clothes worn and the mannerisms of an individual.
Gender expression can be considered a tangible extension
of the intangible gender identity. The word “transgender”
refers to anyone who does not identify with the sex they
were assigned at birth (Brill & Pepper, 2008). However,
just because someone has an atypical gender expression
does not mean they are transgender; here, it is up to the
individual to self-identify. There are a multitude of terms
to describe all nonconforming people in the Western
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world; there is also evidence of similar people in other
non-Western cultures, though they would not necessarily
be called transgender.
Transgender people are not the only ones who are
marginalized because of conflicting identities—the lives
of intersex people are similarly stigmatized. The word
intersex covers a broad range of conditions, but can simply be defined as “when an individual’s body present
ambiguities, anomalies or inconsistencies in the biological components of his or her sexual identity, i.e. in his or
her sex chromosomal, hormonal, and/or morphological
sex” (Fraser & Lima, 2012, p.358). It has been estimated
that one to two children per one hundred births have an
intersex condition, and it has been estimated that nearly
13% of the world population is transgender (Preves, 2009;
Witten & Eyler, 1999).
Essentialism and Social Constructionism Theory
The theory of biological essentialism (or just essentialism) suggests one’s anatomic and genetic sex play
a role in determining the gender of the individual (Johnson, 2005). Essentialism embraces a hard determinist
perspective, where sex and gender are conflated as being
one and the same (Gilden, 2008). While biology itself is
not problematic, it has become an issue surrounding the
rights of both trans men and women (and non-binary
trans people) with regard to their birth assignment. The
assigned sex of transgender people (their birth sex) is
viewed as more natural, more real, than the gender they
identify as, and the problems lies here. The problem is the
focus on the birth sex and anatomy of the trans woman
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as a means of preventing her from living life as a woman. These views contribute to cissexism, which Serano
defines as “the belief that transsexuals’ identified genders
are inferior to, or less authentic than, those of cissexuals
(i.e., people who are not transsexual and who have only
ever experienced their subconscious and physical sexes as
being aligned)” (2007, p.13).
Social constructionism theory seeks to explain how
reality is defined by human beings, and how what may
be true in one culture or time period can be drastically
different in another (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). This
creation of reality takes place in several stages in the culture at large as well as in the individual. The law is a major
factor in determining which behaviors and genders are
normalized, sometimes with the name of science to back
up such claims (Ussher, 1997). However, a body cannot be
abnormal unless there is category defined as normal; bodies that fall along a continuum, like intersex and transgender people, are really only abnormal because they fall out
of what is socially agreed upon as normal (Preves, 2009).
The realm of biology, even for human beings, allows for
unlimited variation; it is only through our minds that this
science becomes limited.
In regards to intersex people, those born with
ambiguous genitalia are often quickly operated on to
ensure that they are categorized as either male or female.
In this way, the sex categories of man and woman are
kept mutually exclusive, and the threat to the binary is
allegedly fixed (Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Preves, 2009). If
such variance is able to consistently reproduce itself time
and again, then it cannot truly be “abnormal” or “unnatural.” The socially constructed views of what is appropriate,
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normal, or natural may result in the marginalization of
individuals whose sexual identities are seen as inappropriate, problematic, or less genuine.
Transgender people, as do intersex people, often
find themselves with limited options in life. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV “categorizes [Gender Identity Disorder, GID] as a psychological
disorder” and forms the basis for medical provider’s treatment of transgender people (Greenberg, 2011, p.209).
The diagnostic criteria state that the desire to become the
opposite sex must “cause clinically significant distress or
impairment in social, occupational, or other important
areas of functioning” (American Psychiatric Association,
1994, p.581). The approach to transition is typically threepronged, with requirements of real-life experience in the
desired gender role, hormone therapy, and sex reassignment surgery (Johnson, 2010). Essentially the choices that
transgender individuals have to make are constrained to
the gender binary (West & Zimmerman, 1991).
If GID were a mental disorder, by default the transgender person would be in distress. If this were the case,
they would not be mentally competent enough to consent
to surgery or the hormonal replacement that commonly
accompany gender transition. Yet a lack of mental distress
could mean a withholding of surgery or hormones, so
the choices for the trans individual are limited (Johnson,
2010). However dysphoric individual trans people may
feel towards their bodies, claiming the label of transgender can be a positive experience and therefore not be a
cause for the aforementioned distress (Riggle et al., 2011).
There is also a concern that children may be referred to
clinics for evaluation, not because of their own distress,
112
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but because of a parent or guardian’s concern at their
cross-gender behavior (McQueen, 2008). Some people
will not fit the criteria for GID and will therefore have no
access to medical resources; relying upon medical diagnosis, therefore, has major limitations (Bornstein, 1994;
Herman 2012).
Medical standards for transsexualism also reinforce
essentialism and cissexism, as many transgender people
are required to behave in a stereotypical gender fashion that serves to reiterate the gender binary (Johnson,
2010, 156; Wentling, 2009). Even if a person is diagnosed
with GID and is able to receive the treatments they need,
they may still be denied significant legal protections.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audited Rhiannon
O’Donnabhain in 2006 for the medical procedures she
underwent as a transgender woman. They “maintained
that O’Donnabhain’s sex reassignment treatment was
elective and cosmetic and thus not eligible for medical
reduction,” but the court ruled in her favor for the most
part (Herman 2012, p.491). However, while they cited O’Donnabhain’s various treatments as cosmetic and
unnecessary, the IRS has “permitted medical deductions
for facelifts, hair transplants, and hair removal” (Herman,
2012, p.498). According to this, surgery to change one’s
body for vanity purposes is perfectly fine, but those done
to alleviate gender dysphoria are unnecessary. In addition,
anti-discrimination laws extend only to sexual orientation; unless otherwise stated, they exclude gender identity
(Johnson, 2010).
Behaving in a heteronormative (even cisnormative)
manner can have very different consequences for trans
men and women, as heterosexuality does not create a
113
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sexual norm alone (Solis, 2007). Femininity or feminine
behaviors in people assigned male at birth have frequently
been targeted as being at-risk for homosexuality (Burke,
1996; Pascoe, 2005; Serano, 2007). Femininity in cisgender women has frequently been used to discredit their
intelligence. For trans women there is again a double
standard; if she acts feminine, she is a caricature, a parody of true womanhood; if she acts masculine, then it is
her “true” nature (her maleness) revealing itself (Serano,
2007; West & Zimmerman, 1991). Masculinity, then, is
privileged over femininity in that sense, for if men and
women are opposites, then so must masculinity and
femininity; and if they are opposites, one must represent strength, power, authenticity, and the other must be
weakness, fragility, and artificial (Fausto-Sterling, 2000;
Serano, 2007; West & Zimmerman, 1991).
Male Privilege and Trans Men
In a study on gender in the workplace, Schilt (2006)
documented the experience of twenty-nine transgender men, whom she divides groups of “open FTMs” and
“stealth FTMs.” The former included trans men who transitioned openly and remained in the same job; the latter
included trans men who transitioned in secret, and have
since gotten jobs as men, with no hints to their transgender status. Schilt found that in both the blue collar and
professional jobs, trans men felt that their experiences
prior to transition greatly shifted once they transitioned
and worked as men (Schilt, 2006). Several, if not all, of the
interviewees could cite specific instances where, had they
still been female-identified, they would have faced dis114
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crimination (Schilt, 2006). Several of them also reported
a major drop in sexual harassment, especially those who
were stealth.
In studies regarding trans men and sex work, transgender men reported sex work within the past year at a
rate of 18.8% out of 16 participants, a rate much lower
than studies that focus on transgender women involved
with sex work (which have reported rates as high as 67%)
(Brennan et al., 2012; Reisner et al., 2010) However, open
trans men were often asked invasive questions about their
sex life and genitals. Many trans men in Schilt’s study
reported having opportunities opened to them as a result
of transitioning, as opposed to remaining gender nonconforming. Wayne reported that, before his legal and medical transition, a previous employer would not allow him
to work at the front because “when I would put the uniform on, she would say, ‘That makes you look like a guy’”
(Schilt, 2006, p.396). Wayne’s boss would not allow him
to the front for fear that customers would no longer come
to the business. Since transitioning, Wayne has not encountered that issue. He believes, with good reason, that
remaining gender ambiguous would have lost him many
economic opportunities. Other studies report that trans
men fear losing their jobs if they come out, and that trans
men often experience slight pay increases after transitioning (Dietert & Dentice, 2010). This is in direct contrast
with studies on trans women, who experience “significant
decrease in pay and status” (Dietert & Dentice, 2010,
p.126).
Male privilege is something that extends to all
men, but in different ways (Johnson, 2005). A white man
experiences male privilege in a way very different from a
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man of color. Race and ethnicity negatively affected many
of the men in the previously mentioned study after their
transition (Schilt, 2006, p.399). Keith, the man mentioned
in the previous paragraph, felt that he had to be more
careful in expressing his anger because of his race. “I went
from being an obnoxious Black woman to a scary Black
man,” he said, feeling that his anger is viewed as more
threatening by white people (Schilt, 2006, p.399). Another black trans man, Aaron, described how his employers
constantly remark at how “threatening” and “aggressive”
he is (Schilt, 2006). The racist imagery of black men often
portrays them as “wild beasts, criminals, and rapists,” so
it should not be surprising that such would be extended
to the black trans man as well as the black cisgender man
(Collins, 2004).
Christopher, an Asian trans man, felt that he was
viewed as less of a man by coworkers due to his race, as
passivity is a stereotype of Asian men. “People have this
impression that Asian guys aren’t macho and therefore
aren’t really male. Or they are not as male as [a white
guy],” he remarked (Schilt, 2006, p.399). The sexuality of
Asian people has long been held up as hermaphroditic
when compared to white sexuality, as have Asian genders
(Lee, 1999). Racist notions are indeed gendered notions,
as racist stereotypes differ by the gender of the individual
and are often upheld by heterosexist notions of gender
(Collins, 2004; Lee, 1999; Somerville 1994). When male
privilege is mentioned alongside transgender men, this is
meant to call attention to how masculinity and maleness
are favored over femininity and femaleness. This does not
mean that all transgender men have the same experiences
or even an easier experience, however.
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Ariel Levy harshly criticized transgender people
assigned female at birth in her book Female Chauvinist
Pigs, claiming that nonbinary people (who were assigned
female at birth) who transition medically are women who
just want male privilege; she asks why anyone would need
hormones and surgery “if gender is supposed to be so
fluid in the first place” (Levy, 2005, p.127). But recall that
medicalized transition is not easy to obtain, especially
not for nonbinary individuals, because of how rigid the
World Professional Association for Transgender Health
(WPATH) standards are, a fact that Levy never points out
or is aware of (Greenberg, 2011; Levy, 2005). Not surprisingly, Levy did not deal with the issues of hypersexualization of trans women (or women of color, for that matter).
While trans men clearly are men and should be called out
on their misogyny, this was about misgendering them and
disrespecting their identities.
There is also the question of male privilege, and
whether or not trans women have it. The fear is that trans
women, having been socialized and raised with male
privilege, will disrupt a woman’s space. This forms the
basis for much discrimination of transgender women;
for example, many all-female colleges will outright refuse
to admit transgender students (Kraschel, 2012). Their
reasoning is based off of Title IX. Universities feared that
admitting trans women would somehow jeopardize federal funding; despite a trans woman’s female identity, there
was a essentialist slant to the counterarguments (Kraschel,
2012). But Title IX can extend to protect transgender
individuals, who are of a disadvantaged gender (Kraschel
2012). In the case of Jennifer Miles, a transgender student harassed by a professor, the courts ruled, “there is no
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conceivable reason why such conduct should be rewarded with legal pardon just because […] plaintiff was not
a biological female” (Kraschel, 2012, p.468). In addition,
women’s only colleges have worked towards ending gender discrimination and seek to empower their students. If
openly transgender students were allowed into women’s
colleges, these universities would challenge “the notion
of a static gender dichotomy” and give aid to a “disadvantaged gender” (Kraschel, 2012). In short, allowing trans
women into an all-women’s college would only strengthen
and expand the message of women’s liberation. Whether
or not trans men should be admitted is an entirely different matter altogether.
Crimes Against Trans Women of Color
Those who commit crimes against transgender
people, especially against trans women, will often cite
trans panic as part of their defense (Greenberg, 2011). In
the murder of Angie Zapata, an eighteen-year-old trans
woman, the defendant Allen Andrade claimed that Angie
had deceived him about her real gender, and this deception caused him to lose control upon learning the truth
(Tilleman, 2010). There have been similar cases in the
past where murders of gay men were justified using the
gay panic defense (Tilleman, 2010). The trans panic defense asserts that the victim, by way of not immediately
revealing their transgender status, somehow provokes a
violent attack from an otherwise “reasonable man” (Tilleman, 2010). Yet there is no legal validity in claiming that a
trans woman’s genitals, much less her existence, are sufficient to allow murderers to walk free (Tilleman, 2010).
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But hate crimes against trans women cannot be excused
with the trans panic defense because the victim has done
nothing wrong; what was done was not defense of one’s
life, but reassertion of pride and wounded masculinity by
eradicating the transgender individual (Kidd & Witten,
2008; Tilleman, 2010). The idea is that the very existence
of the transgender person (especially the transgender
woman) can enrage a cisgender person into a violent attack; it mirrors a similar argument that women can entice
male perpetrators to rape for merely walking down the
street (Kidd &Witten, 2008; Tilleman, 2010).
Such transmisogynistic notions are what make it
difficult for a transgender woman to reach out for help;
the perception of danger can translate to danger in reality
for LGBT people (Robison, 2012). She may be geographically and emotionally isolated from her families for her
transition; she may want to avoid strengthening their
belief that “this is what she gets for being trans” (Greenberg, 2011, p.216). The police may label trans women as
sex workers, and because of this, there may be reluctance
to involve the authorities. If they do call for help, they
may be arrested along with their abuser. Trans women are
often incarcerated “according to her assigned gender at
birth” (Greenberg, 2011, p.234). Placement in a male facility puts trans women at high risk for rape, as in the case
of Patti Shaw. Shaw “had undergone genital surgery and
had identification that reflected her gender as female,”
but was still placed in a cell with male prisoners, who
harassed and raped her (Greenberg, 2011). Many states
such as New York have laws that protect from discrimination based on sexual orientation, but not gender identity
(Tilleman, 2010).
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Domestic shelters for battered women and children
are often varied in their treatment of transgender women. Many will not admit them, while others require proof
of genital surgery or transition (Greenberg, 2011). This
is problematic for two reasons: one, any type of genital
surgery is expensive, and not every trans woman wishes
to have her penis removed. Second, it places the needs
of cisgender women above those of trans women. Some
shelters “claim that if they were to admit trans women,
the shelters could be faced with situations in which male
abusers dress as women in order to access the facility,”
but those shelters that do admit trans women have not
reported such incidences (Greenberg, 2011, p.236). There
have been cases of cisgender lesbian abusers acting as
victims to enter a shelter, but none involving men dressed
as women (Greenberg, 2011). The discomfort of the
residents would not be a reason to deny any other kind
of woman access—for example, a white woman’s desire
to not be housed with a black woman wouldn’t be a good
reason to discriminate for race. It would also not be fair to
discriminate based on religion or sexual orientation.
It is interesting to note this fear of male perpetrators into women’s spaces is a common theme surrounding not only transgender issues, but (cisgender) womens’
rights as well. This issue has raised itself most notably in
the field of female athletics, with sex testing occurring as
early as 1912 (Fausto-Sterling, 2000). As with the domestic violence shelters, there have been next to no incidences of male impersonators, save for one in 1936, though
his maleness did not give him much of an advantage
(Fausto-Sterling, 2000). Much of a person’s socialization
will “exaggerate biological gender differences that already
120
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exist” and causes those who stand out—the boys who are
softer, the girls who are tougher—to hide or lessen their
behaviors (Serano 2007, p.74). It is possible that men are
only stronger because they are perceived to be stronger,
and this perception enforces the so-called essential truths
about gender (West & Zimmerman, 1991).
Much of the abuse of trans women is highly racialized, as “transgender women of color […] are at high
risk for adverse health outcomes because of racial/ethnic
minority status and gender identity, as well as for depression through exposure to transphobia” (Nemoto, 2011,
1980). Many are at high risk for homelessness, with 43%
in a study of 151 trans women having a history of homelessness and 67% engaged in sex work (Brennan et al.,
2012). More than half of them had the thought of committing suicide, and 61% actually attempted it (Nemoto,
2011). The societal and individual discrimination towards
trans women can “limit their employment opportunities
and [change] the dynamics of safe sex negotiation with
partners and increasing the risk of intimate partner violence” (Sanchez et al., 2010, p.352). Other studies have
shown that transgender women are more likely to report
exchange sex, higher rates of depression and social stigma
compared to men who have sex with men, and unstable housing (Sanchez et al., 2009; Sevelius et al., 2009).
Overall, 59.5% of transgender people report violence or
harassment and 37.1% report economic discrimination
(Kidd & Witten, 2008).
Within the prison system, transgender women are
subject to significant and blatant abuses of person. Despite their identification as female, they are often housed
with cisgender men; well above half (59%) report being
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the victim of sexual assault, compared to the rate of 4.4%
within the general population (Anderson, 2011). Incarceration of transgender women of color is quite common
due to police profiling; many trans women are taken into
custody for suspecting them of engaging in sex work,
even if none was actually witnessed at the time (Anderson, 2011). The rates of incarceration for Latina and black
women is higher than that of white women, with a black
woman being 6.9 times more likely to be incarcerated in
her life time, and a Latina woman 2.5 times more likely
compared to a white woman (Crenshaw, 2012). Seeing
as these rates are for cisgender women, it should not be
surprising that the rates would be just as high, if not more
so, for transgender women.
It would be accurate to say that transgender women are often considered to be subhuman, or nonhuman.
Courts have compared transgender women’s transitions
as no better than “a person’s decision to be surgically
transformed into a donkey,” have claimed that “to place
a female name on a male is to combine incompatibles,”
and have overall regarded transitioning, at least from the
male-to-female perspective, as distasteful (Johnson, 2010,
p.160). In childhood, people come to the realization that
“one’s gender is not going to change: a man is a man even
if he dresses like a woman” (Brill & Pepper, 2008, p.63).
It is possible that this remains with people even in adulthood, and would explain at least part of why cissexism is
so deeply ingrained in society, and the courts.
Feminism’s Failures
Within the feminist movement, there is a focus on
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birth assignment as the determining factor in how one
faces oppression; this has been the justification for the
inclusion of trans men and the exclusion of trans women
(Hill-Meyer, 2012; Serano, 2007). Even the queer feminist
reclamation of traditionally harmful forms of media, such
as pornography, feature trans men and cisgender women
more so than trans women (Hill-Meyer, 2012).
There are places and events established by these
feminists as “women-only” spaces (such as The Michigan
Womyn’s Music Festival). The policy of this music festival “is intended to exclude transsexual people, whether
they are male-to-female transsexual (trans women) or
female-to-male transsexuals (trans men)” (Koyama, 2002,
p.5). However, there are performers that enter into this
“womyn-only” space who openly identify as transgender;
indeed, transgender people assigned female at birth are
frequently allowed in as performers and festival attendees, even if they identify as male (Koyama, 2002; Serano,
2007). The reason given is that these people, being assigned female at birth, could never authentically exhibit
maleness or masculinity, even if they should take on
masculine identities or even transition (Serano, 2007). It
is important to remember that transgender women “face
discrimination like cisgender women” and even more so
because they are transgender (Kraschel, 2012, p.480).
Janice Raymond is critic number one of transgender women, having penned a book called The Transsexual
Empire in 1979. She is especially hateful towards transgender women who identify as lesbians and the cisgender
lesbians who would validate their identity, calling such
behavior a mutilation of reality (Raymond, 1994). But
her criticism does not just target transgender women, but
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also cisgender women who use birth control or have had
hysterectomies:
The various “breeds” of women that medical science
can create are endless. There are the women who are
hormonally hooked on continuous doses of estrogen
replacement therapy. ERT supposedly will secure for
them a new life of “eternal femininity. ” There are the
hysterectomized women, purified of their “potentially
lethal” organs for “prophylactic” purposes. Finally,
there is the “she-male”—the male-to-constructed-female transsexual. And the offshoot of this “breed” is
the transsexually constructed lesbian-feminist (Raymond, 1994, p.35).
It seems out of character that someone who identifies as a feminist would find the use of birth control disagreeable, considering how patriarchal structures dictate
that women should have no control over how many
children they have, or what they do with their bodies in
general (Johnson, 2005; Ussher, 1997). The criticisms of
the birth control movement as pushing forward white
supremacy, the religious tenants that preach of the uncleanliness of a woman’s sex organs, and the pathologizing
of homosexuality are all valid criticism of both feminism
and the medical community (Collins, 2004; Somerville,
1994; Ussher, 1997). But Raymond makes the statement
that all of these medical procedures are bad and the medical model serves to legitimize and uphold the so-called
transsexual empire (Raymond, 1994). The idea of the lesbian transsexual woman is, in her mind, a way for men to
add themselves to the lesbian equation (Raymond, 1994).
It is a common theme of heterosexism to project gendered roles onto same-sex relationships, hence the ques124

Volume 16 • Spring 2015

tion, “Which one’s the man and which one’s the woman?”
(Wilton, 1996). Under patriarchy, it is assumed that all
women want a good man, and that lesbians really want
one too, but criticizing heterosexist structures, however, is
not the issue at hand (Wilton 1996). Here she makes clear
that her desire is to exclude trans women on the basis that
they are not ‘real’ women.
Radical feminism puts gender above all other
forms of oppression—that is, that all women suffer alike
under patriarchy regardless of other privileges or lack
of privileges (Koyama, 2000). Assuming this to be true
would mean that transgender women, by the circumstances of their birth, would have access to male privilege,
making them more dangerous than if they had access to
other privileges (white privilege, heterosexual privilege,
etc) (Koyama, 2000). If trans women did have anything
resembling male privilege, however, they would not be at
such a high risk for rape, suicide, and other health disparities that also afflict cisgender women (Anderson, 2011;
Brennan et al., 2012; Greenberg, 2011; Nemoto, 2011).
Another flaw in this logic is that not all women suffer
equally under patriarchy due to the multitude of privileges and oppressions they have in their lives; to be silent
about one for the sake of the other is to risk assimilation
and further oppression (Johnson, 2005; Koyama, 2000).
While the previous passage from Raymond’s book
may be extreme, she has done far more than make inflammatory remarks. In 1981, she authored a report that essentially ended federal and state funding for transgender
people in need, as well as caused insurance companies to
place prohibitions on gender reassignment related claims
(Roberts, 2007). The Human Rights Campaign has had a
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similar outlook on transgender issues, with former executive director Elizabeth Birch having stated that transgender issues would be a legislative priority “over her dead
body” (Roberts, 2007). Though her term as executive
director has long since ended, the HRC has continued to
ignore and stall inclusion of transgender people (Roberts,
2007).
Conclusion
Transgender people, especially trans women, face
multiple health disparities such as sexual assault, homelessness, lack of legal protections, and other pressing
issues. Other factors such as race play into their oppression as well. Transgender people, especially women, will
be able to have their rights fully recognized if all parts of
their identities are not taken into account—their race,
their class and education level, whether or not they have
engaged in sex work, their sexual orientation, etc. All of
these oppressions are connected; therefore they must all
be eliminated. Some have suggested eliminating gender
because of its socially constructed nature (Bornstein,
1994, p.56—57), but this is detrimental. Gender is something that many trans people have had to fight for, and to
take it away would be dishonoring that struggle.
There is no correct way to fight for trans rights, but
the focus should surely be on the issues that trans women
face. While all transgender people are pathologized and
identity-policed, harmful medical standards prevent trans
women from getting the care they need. Terms like autogynephilia and transvestitic fetishism were featured in
the previous DSM and, if not widely talked about, are still
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believed to be relevant to trans women; no such terms
exist for trans men (Moser). The male-dominated medical
community has always mistreated women, whether they
are cisgender or transgender, and this must be eliminated.
Some topics were not explored as greatly in this
work, such as employment discrimination, parental custody rights in cases where a parent or child is transgender,
aging transgender people, and the history of the transgender movement in the U.S. There are a number of issues
that have yet to be fully delved into, but as stated prior,
there is a lot of ground to cover when fighting for the
rights of a marginalized group because there are so many
at the axis of oppressions. There are very few people, aside
from the most privileged, who do not experience multiple
oppressions all at the same time, and ignoring even one
can slow the movement towards freedom down.
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